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Abstract
We introduce the concept of Hamiltonian potential function for noncooperative open-loop
diﬀerential games with n players, n controls and n states, and characterise a suﬃcient con-
dition for its existence. We also identify a class of games admitting a Hamiltonian potential
and provide appropriate examples pertaining to advertising, industrial organization and
macroeconomic policy.
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1 Introduction
Following Monderer and Shapley (1996), a relatively large literature has investigated
potential functions for static games. In a potential game, the information about Nash
equilibria is nested into a single real-valued function (the potential function) over the
strategy space. The specific feature of a potential function defined for a given game is
that the gradient of the corresponding potential function coincides with the vector of first
derivatives of the individual payoﬀ functions of the original game itself. As stressed by
Slade (1996), the interest of this line of research is that, in a game admitting a potential
function it is as if players were jointly maximising that single function instead of competing
to maximise their respective payoﬀs.
To the best of our knowledge, no attempt has been made as yet concerning the con-
struction of a potential function for diﬀerential games. Here, we will confine our attention
to the solution of noncooperative open-loop diﬀerential games. Given that the necessary
conditions for the solution of an open-loop dynamic game contain the adjoint equations
in addition to the first order conditions on controls, verifying the existence of a potential
function for such a game is essentially diﬀerent from carrying out the same task for a static
game. What a potential function must accomplish in a dynamic game is to reproduce
the same dynamic system (state and control equations) and achieve the same open-loop
solution(s) the original game yields. We refer to this function as a Hamiltonian potential
function.
We provide a suﬃcient condition for the existence of the Hamiltonian potential func-
tion in a generic noncooperative open-loop diﬀerential game, and subsequently identify
a class of games admitting a Hamiltonian potential function. Then, we illustrate three
examples belonging to diﬀerent areas of economics and management.
1
2 A potential for diﬀerential games
2.1 Potential in static games
We briefly recall the concept of potential in static noncooperative, full information games.
We borrow from physics the following:
Definition 1 A given vector field F = (F1(s), . . . , Fn(s)) is conservative if there exists a
diﬀerentiable function P (s) such that:
∂P (s)
∂si
= Fi (s) , i = 1, . . . , n.
P (s) is called a potential function for F .
Given a game G where N = {1, 2, 3, ..., n} is the set of players, each one of them
endowed with the profit function πi(·), if the vector field (π1(·), . . . , πn(·)) is conservative,
then it admits a potential function and it is an exact potential game in the sense of
Monderer and Shapley (1996).
A potential in a static framework contains all the relevant information of the original
static n-players game. Analogously, a Hamiltonian potential contains all the relevant
information of the original dynamic n-players game. In next subsection we consider a class
of diﬀerential games and we provide some requirements allowing for the construction of a
Hamiltonian potential. Note that this definition will necessarily diﬀer from the one given
in Monderer and Shapley (1996) and the rest of the related literature, as state variables
do not appear in static games.
2.2 The dynamic set up: definitions
In the following, we define a (normal) diﬀerential game, together with the appropriate
requirements allowing for the construction of a Hamiltonian potential function, if it exists.
Consider an infinite horizon diﬀerential game Γ with the following features:
• n is the number of players;
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• x(t) = (x1(t), . . . , xn(t)) ∈ X ⊂ Rn, where X is a bounded and open set, is a vector
of state variables;
• u(t) ∈ U := U1× . . .×Un is a vector of control variables; ui(t) is the control related
to the i-th player. The set Ui is also bounded and open for every i = 1, . . . , n;
• the i-th player is endowed with the instantaneous payoﬀ πi(x(t),u(t), t) and is sup-
posed to maximize the discounted objective functional:
Ji ≡
Z ∞
t0
e−ρtπi(x(t),u(t), t)dt (1)
subject to the kinematic equation:
⎧
⎨
⎩
x˙i(t) = gi(x(t),u(t), t)
xi(t0) = xi0
, (2)
where gi(·) ∈ C2(X ×U × [t0,∞)), i = 1, . . . , n and ρ is the intertemporal discount
rate, constant and common to all agents.1
That is, we confine our attention to a setup with n players, each endowed with one
control and one state. This is of course a special case; however, it is of interest in terms
of applications to economics, where this structure is rather common.
The standard technique requires constructing a Hamiltonian function of each agent as
follows:
Hi(·) = πi(x(t),u(t), t) + λii(t)gi(x(t),u(t), t) +
X
j 6=i
λij(t)gj(x(t),u(t), t), (3)
where λij(t) is the costate variable associated by player i with state variable xj; suppose
Hi ∈ C2(X × U ×Rn×n × [t0,∞)). x (0) is the vector of initial conditions on states.
Here we confine our attention to interior open-loop Nash (i.e., simultaneous) equilibria.
The related necessary conditions taken on (3) are (omitting arguments for brevity):
∂Hi
∂ui
= 0⇔ ∂πi
∂ui
+ λii
∂gi
∂ui
+
X
j 6=i
λij
∂gj
∂ui
= 0 (4)
1For the sake of simplicity, we assume that all agents have the same time preferences.
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−∂Hi
∂xi
= λ˙ii − ρλii (5)
−∂Hi
∂xj
= λ˙ij − ρλij ∀j 6= i (6)
plus the transversality conditions:
lim
t→∞
λij = 0∀i, j. (7)
In a static game, the construction of the corresponding potential function (if it exists)
requires integrating the n first-order conditions on choice variables, summing up the in-
tegrals and checking whether what results from this procedure is indeed a conservative
field.
In a diﬀerential game framework, we are looking for the potential function of a game
with n controls and n states, and therefore also n costates. The whole set of necessary
conditions taken for the population of players consists therefore of n FOCs on controls
(like (4), one for each player) and n× n costate equations (like (5-6), n for each player).
Now, there immediately arises a diﬃculty with costates, as (4) (and, most likely, (5)),
will contain λij (for at least some j 6= i). Therefore, integrating all partial derivatives
∂Hi/∂xj, j 6= i, and summing them up, would yield a function containing not n but n×n
costates. Clearly, if it can be established that either λij = 0 for all j 6= i, or costates λij
do not appear in (4-5), then, taking into account FOCs (4), the set of partial derivatives
to be integrated reduces to 2n and the game may admit a potential function. These
properties can be checked either by examination of the necessary conditions or when one
of the following cases occurs.
• Consider the most general case of all, with x˙i = gi(x,u, t) for all i = 1, . . . , n. If so,
then
∂2Hi
∂ui∂λij
6= 0 and ∂
2Hi
∂xi∂λij
6= 0. (8)
Therefore, we need (6) to admit the solution λij = 0 at all t.
• A simpler case is that where x˙i = gi(x, ui, t) for all i = 1, . . . , n. Here,
∂2Hi
∂ui∂λij
= 0 but
∂2Hi
∂xi∂λij
6= 0, (9)
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and again we need (6) to admit the solution λij = 0 at all t.
• The third case is that where x˙i = gi(xi,u, t) for all i = 1, . . . , n. also here we need
(6) to admit the solution λij = 0 at all t, since
∂2Hi
∂ui∂λij
6= 0 and ∂
2Hi
∂xi∂λij
= 0. (10)
• The last, and simplest, case is the setup where x˙i = gi(xi, ui, t) for all i = 1, . . . , n.
As the game exhibits separate state dynamics,
∂2Hi
∂ui∂λij
= 0 and
∂2Hi
∂xi∂λij
= 0 (11)
and therefore the solution of (6) w.r.t. λij is in fact irrelevant.2
Whenever the game does not feature separate state dynamics, a suﬃcient condition
for (6) to admit the null solution is the following:
Proposition 2 If there exist n− 1 functions 'j(xj) such that
∂Hi
∂xj
= λij'j(xj)
for all i, j = 1, . . . , n, i 6= j, then (6) admits the solution λij = 0 at all t, for all j 6= i.
Proof. We rewrite the adjoint equations (6) in this case:
λ˙ij − ρλij = −λij'j(xj), (12)
∀j 6= i. This equations can be elementarily solved by separation of variables, and the
solutions are:
λij(t) = λij (t0) e
R∞
t0
(ρ−ϕj(xj(s)))ds, (13)
obviously null for the initial condition λij (t0) = 0.
In the remainder, we confine our attention on games where either (i) state dynamics
are separate, or (ii) any adjoint equation (6) admits the solution λij = 0 at all t. It is now
convenient to define vector λii := (λ11, λ22, . . . , λjj, . . . , λnn).
2Observe that, if λij is either nil or irrelevant, the symmetry assumption concerning time discounting
is not critical.
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Definition 3 Given a diﬀerential game Γ with Hamiltonians Hi, we define the Hamil-
tonian potential for game Γ as the function HP (u,x,λii), such that:µ
∂HP
∂u1
, . . . ,
∂HP
∂un
,
∂HP
∂x1
, . . . ,
∂HP
∂xn
¶
=
µ
∂H1
∂u1
, . . . ,
∂Hn
∂un
,
∂H1
∂x1
, . . . ,
∂Hn
∂xn
¶
. (14)
If it exists, a Hamiltonian potential function HP for game Γ is a real-valued function
that contains all the relevant information of the original diﬀerential game. The require-
ment on HP is that the partial derivatives of the individual Hamiltonian functions with
respect to states and controls are replicated, i.e., that the gradient of HP w.r.t. states
xi (t) and controls ui (t) replicates ∂Hi(·)/∂xi (t) and ∂Hi(·)/∂ui (t) for all i.
2.3 Hamiltonian potential: construction and properties
The Hamiltonian potential is the Hamiltonian function of a fictitious player replacing
the original n players involved in game Γ, and endowed with the task of replicating the
set of FOCs on controls as well as the n adjoint equations that are neither irrelevant nor
admit a null solution, and finally reproducing the same control dynamics as in the original
game. The final outcome of this procedure must be the same dynamic system of state
and control equations as in game Γ.
Now we show the construction of a Hamiltonian potential and a class of diﬀerential
games that admit a Hamiltonian potential.
Proposition 4 If there exists a function bP (u1, . . . , un, x1, . . . , xn,λii) such that:
∂ bP
∂ui
+ λii
∂x˙i
∂ui
+
X
j 6=i
λjj
∂x˙j
∂ui
=
∂Hi
∂ui
(15)
∂ bP
∂xi
+ λii
∂x˙i
∂xi
+
X
j 6=i
λjj
∂x˙j
∂xi
=
∂Hi
∂xi
(16)
for all i, j = 1, . . . , n, then the game Γ with Hamiltonians Hi admits a Hamiltonian
potential with the following form:
HP (u,x,λii) = bP (u1, . . . , un, x1, . . . , xn,λii) + nX
i=1
λiix˙i. (17)
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Proof. It immediately follows from Definition 2.
Relying on the required structure, we can set up a class of diﬀerential games admit-
ting a Hamilton potential and subsequently state a formula for such a function. As a
preliminary step in this direction, we introduce the following:
Definition 5 A Hamiltonian of the type:
Hi(u,x,λii) = αi(ui,λii) +
X
j 6=i
αj(uj,λii) + γi(xi,λii) +
X
j 6=i
γj(xj,λii) (18)
where αi(·) and γi(·) are C2 functions with respect to all their variables, for all i = 1, . . . , n,
is called additively separable in states and controls.
Proposition 6 Every diﬀerential game Γ with additively separable Hamiltonians as in
Definition 5 admits a Hamiltonian potential.
Proof. The additively separable form of the Hamiltonian functions allows us to obtain a
conservative vector field. In fact, consider the 2n coordinate vectorµ
∂α1
∂u1
, . . . ,
∂αn
∂un
,
∂γ1
∂x1
, . . . ,
∂γn
∂xn
¶
.
The j-th component of this vector is a function which only depends on the costate variables
and on either the j-th control or the (j − n)-th state, so that a potential for this vector
field exists and it is easily calculable.
It is worth stressing that the regularity requirements on the functions appearing in
(18) might be considered much too restrictive, but in several economic models they are
certainly satisfied. Appropriate examples will be presented in the next section.
When Proposition 6 holds, it may be useful to reformulate the FOCs and the adjoint
equations of the diﬀerential game to achieve the open-loop equilibrium trajectories:
∂HP
∂ui
= 0 ⇐⇒ ∂αi
∂ui
= 0 (19)
λ˙ii − ρλii = −
∂HP
∂xi
= −∂γi
∂xi
(20)
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plus the appropriate transversality conditions.
By diﬀerentiating the FOCs with respect to time and by substitution in (20), we
obtain a set of first order diﬀerential equations. Together with the equations of motion
of the state variables, the dynamic system in states and controls completely describes the
optimal trajectories of the game.
In the remainder, we illustrate two versions of the Leitmann and Schmitendorf (1978)
diﬀerential game of advertising, a macroeconomic policy game and an advertising game
with product quality dynamics. The first three games are characterised by null solutions
to (6), while the fourth model is an example of the case where every λij, for all j 6= i, is
irrelevant.
3 Examples
3.1 The original Leitmann-Schmitendorf diﬀerential game
Consider now the game proposed by Leitmann and Schmitendorf (1978),3 where 2 firms
sell substitutable goods and invest in advertising to determine their market share xi ≥ 0,
with i ∈ {1, 2}. Individual market share evolves over time as follows:
x˙1 = u1 − b1x1 −
c1u21
2
− a1x1u2, (21)
x˙2 = u2 − b2x2 −
c2u22
2
− a2x2u1, (22)
where ui ∈ [0, 1/ci) is firm i’s advertising control,4 ai, bi and ci are positive parameters,
and shares are subject to the following constraints:
x1(t), x2(t) ≥ 0, x1(t) + x2(t) ≤ 1.
Investment in advertising has a linear cost, so that the profit function for player i is
3See also Feichtinger (1983).
4In the original version, the set of controls is compact. However, here we assume it is bounded and
open and confine our attention to interior solutions. This has no particular bearings on the (non) existence
of the Hamiltonian potential.
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πi = pixi − ui.
The problem is
max
ui
Ji ≡
Z ∞
0
e−ρtπidt
subject to (21) and (22). The corresponding current-value Hamiltonian functions for
player 1 and 2 are, respectively (we omit the dependence on the costate variables):
H1(u1, u2, x1, x2)=π1 + λ11x˙1 + λ12x˙2
= p1x1 − u1 + λ11(u1 − b1x1 −
c1u21
2
− a1x1u2)
+λ12(u2 − b2x2 −
c21u22
2
− a2x2u1)
H2(u1, u2, x1, x2)=π2 + λ21x˙1 + λ22x˙2
= p1x2 − u2 + λ21(u1 − b1x1 −
c1u21
2
− a1x1u2)
+λ22(u2 − b2x2 −
c21u22
2
− a2x2u1)
The necessary conditions are:
∂Hi
∂ui
= 0⇔ −1 + λii (1− ciui)− λijajxj = 0 (23)
−∂Hi
∂xi
= λ˙ii − ρλii ⇔ λ˙ii = λii (bi + aiuj + ρ)− pi (24)
−∂Hi
∂xj
= λ˙ij − ρλij ⇔ λ˙ij = λij (bj + ajui + ρ) (25)
with j = −i. Given that the game is state redundant and (25) admits the solution
λij = 0 at all t, this costate equation and the related partial derivative ∂Hi/∂xj can
be disregarded. If we try to construct the potential for this game integrating the partial
derivatives of all Hamiltonians with respect to the four variables (two states and two
controls) we obtain the following:
Ψ =
2X
i=1
µZ
∂Hi
∂xi
dxi +
Z
∂Hi
∂ui
dui
¶
=
2X
i=1
[pixi + ui (λii − 1− ajλjjxj)] +
9
−
2X
i=1
µ
biλiixi +
1
2
ciλiiu2i
¶
(26)
with
∂Ψ
∂ui
= −1 + λii (1− ciui)− λjjajxj (27)
∂Ψ
∂xi
= pi − biλii − λiiaiuj . (28)
Clearly, (28) coincides with ∂Hi/∂xi, while (27) diﬀers from ∂Hi/∂ui, which, taking into
account λij = 0, rewrites as −1 + λii (1− ciui) , whereby
∂Ψ
∂ui
− ∂Hi
∂ui
= −λjjajxj,
which is the external eﬀect exerted on the state of firm j via the control ui. Now, if one
tries to clean this eﬀect away, using
bΨ = Ψ+ 2X
i=1
λiiaixiuj
the result is
∂bΨ
∂ui
= −1 + λii (1− ciui) (29)
∂bΨ
∂xi
= pi − biλii (30)
so that the partial derivatives taken on controls now coincide with the corresponding
FOCs of the original game, but this is no longer true for the partial derivatives w.r.t.
states. Hence, the associated vector field is not conservative and the game does not admit
a potential function.
It is worth stressing that this is the consequence of the spillover (or external) eﬀects
appearing in the state equations, which are designed in such a way that they introduce
a problematic interplay between the state of player i and the control of player j. The
next section illustrates a diﬀerent version of the advertising game, where this aspect is
accounted for without compromising the structure and properties of the original game,
and, at the same time, to ensure the existence of a potential function.
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3.2 A simplified version
Consider now a simplified version of the previous game where the individual market share
changes over time as a function of the investment in advertising ui ≥ 0 of each firm and
decreases over time at a fixed rate δ ≥ 0:
x˙i = ui + suj − δxi. (31)
Note that here (31) still features an externality from the control of j onto the state of i
but there is no direct interplay between uj and xi; parameter s ∈ [−1, 1] measures the
spillover eﬀect, as in the static version. The instantaneous profit of firm i is πi = pxi−bu2i .5
Denoting by ρ ≥ 0 the intertemporal discount rate, each firm has to determine the amount
of advertising that solves the following problem
max
ui
Ji ≡
Z ∞
0
e−ρtπidt,
subject to (31). The corresponding current-value Hamiltonians are:
H1(·)=π1 + λ11x˙1 + λ12x˙2
H2(·)=π2 + λ22x˙2 + λ21x˙1
The application of Pontryiagin’s Maximum Principle leads to the following necessary
optimality conditions:
∂H1
∂u1
= −2bu1 + λ11 + λ12s (32)
∂H2
∂u2
= −2bu2 + λ22 + λ21s (33)
λ˙11 = ρλ11 −
∂H1
∂x1
= (ρ+ δ)λ11 + p (34)
λ˙12 = ρλ12 −
∂H1
∂x2
= (ρ+ δ)λ12
5For simplicity we set pi = pj = p, involving no loss of generality.
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λ˙22 = ρλ22 −
∂H2
∂x2
= (ρ+ δ)λ22 + p (35)
λ˙21 = ρλ21 −
∂H2
∂x1
= (ρ+ δ)λ21
where, since Proposition 2 applies, the solutions λ12 ≡ 0, λ21 ≡ 0 are admissible at every
instant, implying ∂H1/∂x2 = ∂H2/∂x1 = 0 at all t. On the basis of conditions (32-35),
we can state:
Proposition 7 The game is state redundant. Therefore, the open-loop equilibrium is a
degenerate feedback (i.e., it is strongly time consistent).
Diﬀerentiating (32) with respect to time yields
u˙1 =
1
2b
(λ˙11 + λ˙12s) = u1(δ + ρ)−
p
2b
u˙2 =
1
2b
(λ˙22 + λ˙21s) = u2(δ + ρ)−
p
2b
The steady state values of ussi and x
ss
i are:
uss1 =u
ss
2 =
p
2b(δ + ρ)
(36)
xss1 =x
ss
2 =
p
2bδ(δ + ρ)
(1 + s) (37)
which yield the steady state individual profits:
πss1 = π
ss
2 =
p2
4bδ(δ + ρ)2
[δ + 2ρ+ 2(δ + ρ)s] . (38)
Note that, in the limit case in which there is no baseline demand, the investment
in advertisement completely depreciates overnight and the firm does not discount future
payoﬀs, i.e. x¯ = 0, δ = 1 and ρ = 0, the solution of the static and the diﬀerential game
coincide.
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Since the Hamiltonian of the game is additively separable in states and controls,
Proposition 6 applies and the following Hamiltonian potential HP (·) can be constructed:
HP (u,x,λii)=
2X
i=1
µZ
∂Hi
∂xi
dxi +
Z
∂Hi
∂ui
dui
¶
=−b(u21 + u22) + p(x1 + x2) + λ11u1 + λ22u2 − δ(λ11x1 + λ22x2)
= bP (·)+λ11(u1 + su2 − δx1)+λ22(u2 + su1 − δx2)
where
bP (u1, u2, x1, x2, λ11, λ22) = −b(u21 + u22) + p(x1 + x2)− (λ11u2 + λ22u1)s.
Therefore,
Proposition 8 The open-loop game admits a Hamiltonian potential.
That is, reshaping the externalities appearing in the state equations in such a way that
they do not feature a multiplicative eﬀect between states and controls yields as a result
that the game is indeed a potential one. Note that the diﬀerent approaches characterising
the original Leitmann-Schmitendorf game and this modified version reflect two diﬀerent
definitions of the spillover eﬀect that have been ”coded” relatively long ago in the literature
on R&D for process innovation. The one appearing in Leitmann-Schmitendorf nests into
what Kamien and Zang (2000) call absorptive capacity (because the ability of firm i to
aﬀect the state of firm j depends on the stock of firm j’s state), while that appearing in
the new version is independent of the state and replicates the functional form adopted by
d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) in a static model and Cellini and Lambertini (2005)
in a dynamic one.
3.3 A macroeconomic policy game
The setup is a dynamic version of Lambertini and Rovelli (2004). The game takes place
in a single country, between a central bank (B) controlling the nominal interest rate
r ≥ 0 and a fiscal authority (F ) controlling the budget deficit f ∈
¡
−f, f
¢
. Where f is
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introduced to measure an exogenous upper (lower) bound to surplus (deficit). The states
are the inflation rate π and GNP (gross national product) y, whose respective dynamic
equations are:
·
π=βf + δ (r − π) (39)
·
y=ϕ (y − y∗) + ηf (40)
where β, δ, η, ϕ are positive parameters and y∗ is the benchmark (or full employment)
level of income, exogenously given.
The instantaneous payoﬀ functions of players are represented by the following loss
functions:
LB = (π − π∗)2 + θ (r − r∗)2 (41)
LF = (y − y∗)2 + υf2 (42)
where θ and υ are positive parameters. As usual in this literature, the central banker is
keen on using monetary policy to aﬀect the behaviour of national income, the more so
the higher is parameter θ.
The Hamiltonian functions are:
HB = (π − π∗)2 + θ (r − r∗)2 + λBπ [βf + δ (r − π)] + λBy [ϕ (y − y∗) + ηf ] (43)
HF = (y − y∗)2 + υf2 + λFπ [βf + δ (r − π)] + λFy [ϕ (y − y∗) + ηf ] . (44)
The set of necessary conditions is:
∂HB
∂r
= 2θ (r − r∗) + δλBπ = 0 (45)
∂HF
∂f
= 2υf + βλFπ + ηλFy = 0 (46)
·
λBπ = (ρ+ δ)λBπ − 2 (π − π∗) (47)
·
λBy = (ρ− ϕ)λBy (48)
·
λFπ = (ρ+ δ)λFπ (49)
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·
λFy = (ρ− ϕ)λFy − 2 (y − y∗) (50)
Clearly, on the basis of Proposition 2 costate equations (48-49) admit the solution λBy =
λFπ = 0 at all t. Since Propositions 3 and 5 apply, we show the Hamiltonian potential of
the present game:
HP (u,x,λii) =
Z
∂HB
∂r
dr +
Z
∂HB
∂π
dπ +
Z
∂HF
∂f
df +
Z
∂HF
∂y
dy (51)
= θ (r − r∗)2 + (π − π∗)2 + υf2 + (y − y∗)2 + λFy (ηf + ϕy) + λBπ (r − π) δ
= bP (·) + λBπ ·π + λFy ·y
with bP (·) = θ (r − r∗)2 + (π − π∗)2 + υf2 + (y − y∗)2 − λBπβf + λFyϕy∗. (52)
3.4 A marketing game with product quality improvement
Here we propose a simple marketing game where two firms invest in R&D to increase
their respective product qualities, which in turn determine market shares. This game
nests into a wide literature in marketing and management (see Feichtinger et al., 1994,
and Jørgensen and Zaccour, 2004, for exhaustive surveys). Each firm i sells a single good
of quality qi, i ∈ {H,L} , with Q > qH ≥ qL ≥ 0, Q being the exogenously given utmost
quality level which the industry can supply. At every instant, the market share of firm i
is σi = α+ qi − ξqj, ξ ∈ [0, 1] , and σi + σj ≤ 1.
Qualities are state variables evolving according to the dynamics:
·
qi = ki − ςqi (53)
where ki ≥ 0 is the R&D control and ς > 0 is a constant decay rate common to both
firms. The instantaneous R&D cost is Ci (ki) = ck2i , and the instantaneous profit of firm
i is πi = piσi − ck2i . We consider the price pi as an exogenously given parameter.
The resulting Hamiltonian of firm i is:
Hi = pi [α+ qi − ξqj]− ck2i + λii (ki − ςqi) + λij (kj − ςqj) . (54)
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The first order condition on control is
∂Hi
∂ki
= −2cki + λii = 0 (55)
and the adjoint equations are
λ˙ii = λii (ρ+ ς)− pi (56)
λ˙ij = λij (ρ+ ς) + ξpi (57)
Now observe that the diﬀerential equation describing the dynamics of λij does not admit
a null solution. Notwithstanding that, the costate equation (57) is indeed irrelevant as
the FOC on control ki only contains λii, therefore the set of partial derivatives to be
integrated reduces to 2n. Since the Hamiltonians are additively separable, Proposition 6
applies and the following Hamiltonian potential can be constructed:
HP (k,q,λii) =
2X
i=1
µZ
∂Hi
∂ki
dki +
Z
∂Hi
∂qi
dqi
¶
(58)
= p1q1 + p2q2 − c(k21 + k22) + λ11 (k1 − ςq1) + λ22 (k2 − ςq2)
= bP (·) + λ11q˙11 + λ22q˙22
with bP (·) = p1q1 + p2q2 − c(k21 + k22). (59)
4 Concluding remarks and extensions
Here we have started developing the analysis of potential functions for diﬀerential games,
studying a specific class of open-loop games that can be taken as a point of departure
for further developments. In particular, we have analysed open-loop games with separate
state dynamics. This clearly leaves an open question as to the possibility of proving the
existence of potential functions for more general classes of games, and, specifically, in the
feedback formulation. One additional open question is whether a Hamiltonian potential
can be found to exist in setups where the structure is diﬀerent from the one we have
considered here, e.g. where there is a single state variable for all players. These issus are
left for future research.
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